Interview with the Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla (PBSP)

Material: Could you tell us about your party—its foundation, history, and ideological basis, as well as its recent developments?

PBSP: In the 1960s, the international communist movement split during the great communist debates. On one side was the Khrushchev-led revisionism of the Soviet Union, and on the other was Mao Zedong’s revolutionary line and ideology. From the very beginning, our party embraced Maoism—at that time referred to as Mao Zedong Thought—as the third and higher stage of Marxism. However, the adoption and application of Maoism in our country’s Maoist movement faced various weaknesses. This caused early fragmentation of the Maoist movement in our region.
Our party was founded by Comrade Siraj Sikder in 1971 during the turbulent times of the war when the Pakistani rulers imposed a brutal genocide on the people of East Bengal. In response, the masses of East Bengal took up arms to fight for independence from Pakistan and establish a new state. Before this, in 1967, Comrade Siraj Sikder formed the “Mao Zedong Thought Research Center,” an ideological study group aimed at studying and mastering Mao’s Thought and forming a cadre group of Maoist followers.
It’s important to note that several other Maoist centers were also forming at the time, but due to various ideological weaknesses and deviations, no unified Maoist party emerged. Our party was part of this broader process. Subsequently, in 1968, Comrade Siraj Sikder founded the East Bengal Workers Movement as a preparatory organization for establishing a revolutionary Maoist communist party. Through both theoretical and practical struggles, the East Bengal Workers Movement advanced the process of party formation. On March 25, 1971, when the Pakistani army initiated mass killings and the bourgeois nationalist party, the Awami League, fled to India, the East Bengal Workers Movement called for the seizure of arms and the formation of armed forces. Under the leadership of Sikder, a temporary base was established in the Peyarabagan region of Barisal. Amidst the war against the Pakistani military, on June 3, 1971, the Proletarian Party of Purbo Bangla (Purbo Bangla, meaning East Bengal) was formally founded at a representative conference held at Peyarabagan. Comrade Siraj Sikder was elected as the party’s chair.
Meanwhile, Awami League loyalists who had fled to India returned as “freedom fighters.” Alongside the Pakistani military, they also launched attacks on our party. Internationally, the war in East Bengal was part of the larger inter-imperialist conflict. On one side were the US-led imperialists and the Pakistani army, and on the other were Soviet social-imperialism and Indian expansionism. Faced with attacks from both the Pakistani military and Awami League loyalists, our party was forced to retreat from Peyarabagan in June 1971. At that time, we denounced the expatriate government of the Awami League formed in India as Russian-Indian stooges, despite their posturing as patriots. We adopted the line of waging a self-reliant liberation struggle free from all imperialist powers, including the US and Indian expansionism, to achieve a national democratic revolution.
However, due to various ideological deviations within the Maoist movement in East Bengal, including within our own party, our struggle faced significant setback. On December 16, 1971, backed by the Soviet Union and India and acting as their agents, they created the new state.
After the state of Bangladesh was established on December 16, 1971, our party analyzed it as a sham independence. In 1972, we held our first party congress where Comrade Siraj Sikder was elected as the chairman of the central committee. From 1973 to 1974, armed revolutionary uprisings took place across the country, especially under our party’s leadership. During this period, Sheikh Mujibur’s Awami League was moving towards one-party, BAKSHAL, authoritarian rule, establishing the Rakkhi Bahini, a brutal paramilitary force, with direct Indian support. Around 30,000 Maoists and leftists were massacred during this period.
This repression weakened our revolutionary struggle. On January 1, 1975, Comrade Sikder was arrested and assassinated while in custody the following day. The state fabricated a false story about his death, which the people rejected. After his death, the party faced internal crises, a split, and ideological debates, leading to the collapse of the central leadership structure.
By the late 1977, Comrade Anwar Kabir assumed leadership of the party’s central committee, forming the Highest Revolutionary Council (SBP). He has led the party for nearly five decades, navigating through various internal and international struggles. He initiated the process of summarizing the party line and struggles from 1968 to 1976 based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism (MLM). At the same time, he exposed and fought against the revisionism of the post-Mao Chinese Communist Party and the Three Worlds Theory. In addition, he waged a theoretical and ideological struggle against the Hoxhaite line, culminating in his famous book In Defence of Mao Zedong Thought. This work effectively buried the Hoxhaite influence from a theoretical standpoint in our country and upheld the banner of Maoism.
Under the leadership of Comrade Anwar Kabir, the party spearheaded a nationwide armed revolutionary uprising during 1987–88. Many sincere Maoist groups and individuals, previously divided, united under this center. The Hoxhaite factions were defeated in practice and became isolated from the masses. In 1984, the party joined the international center RIM (Revolutionary Internationalist Movement), aimed at building a Fourth International. The party’s second national congress was held in 1987 in the a guerrilla region, which was a significant success. Comrade Anwar Kabir was elected as the party’s general secretary.
However, alarmed by this revolutionary upsurge, the ruling classes and the state apparatus, under the military dictatorship of Ershad,1 launched a comprehensive campaign across the country to crush the party and the people’s war. This resulted in significant losses for the party, with key guerrilla regions falling out of its control.
In this challenging context, the party held its 3rd National Congress in 1992, aiming to synthesize the lessons from the above-mentioned setbacks. However, this synthesis was incomplete and marked by certain deviations. Shortly after the 3rd Congress, a major two-line struggle emerged within the party, centered on the summation of past struggles and failures. As a result, by 1998–1999, the party split into three different factions. Under the leadership of Comrade Anwar Kabir, the process of summarizing the party line and struggles continued. This culminated in the National Representative Conference of 2011, where the “New Thesis” was adopted, encapsulating four decades of experiences of the Maoist movement in the country, as compiled by Comrade Anwar Kabir.
In 2017, the 4th Congress was held. During and after the Congress, based on the New Thesis, the party developed a new strategic plan, a comprehensive document synthesizing five decades of military line, an initial analysis of the new political economy, and a program for the New Democratic Revolution. Additionally, documents addressing Chinese social-imperialism and advancing the ongoing international line struggle were drafted. Alongside this, a tactical line for combating the ruling Hasina-Awami fascism was formulated and implemented. In this way, the party distilled over five decades of experience of the Maoist movement in our country, presenting it as the guiding line for both the party and the broader Maoist movement here. Efforts are underway to revitalize Maoist activities among students and youth, mobilize workers along Maoist lines, organize the women along the revolutionary stream, organize progressive intellectuals opposed to imperialism, and build movements among oppressed national minorities in both the hills and plains. Above all, under the leadership of the party, rural-based protracted people’s war, centered on agrarian revolution, is being developed. The protracted people’s war is principal and urban-based mass movement is secondary. In rural areas, the mass movement is also very important, but in support of the people’s war.

Material: Although limited and biased, there was some coverage of the student protests in Bangladesh in the recent months, triggered by the state’s intentions to increase or change the quotas for hiring in the public sector. Could you explain the quota system and why this one policy change set off such a firestorm of actions in response?

PBSP: The quota system was first introduced in 1997, during Hasina’s initial term, to reserve public sector jobs for the children of Awami freedom fighters. After returning to power in 2009, Hasina intensified her agenda of monopolizing the state apparatus through the “Awamisation” process. This culminated in the 2014 sham elections, where the Awami League won almost all parliamentary seats without opposition. In 2011, the quota for freedom fighters was extended to include their grandchildren, raising the freedom fighter quota to 30%. Prior to this, 26% of jobs had already been reserved for marginalized communities, though in practice, these too were often appropriated by Awami League loyalists. As a result, 56% of public sector jobs became tied to quotas, effectively securing them for Awami League supporters. This left only 44% of jobs available for recruitment based on merit and qualifications. However, due to Hasina’s authoritarian regime and the pervasive corruption, bribery, and control by syndicates, even this limited 44% was beyond the reach of educated children from the middle class, lower-middle class, and working peasant families.
As a result, the future of meritorious students increasingly becomes bleak. A portion of them, even while still in their student years, are drawn into gang activities, extortion, drugs, and online gambling such as casinos. Some, unable to cope, even resort to suicide. A large number of these students fall victim to the curse of unemployment; many are forced into low-paid jobs in NGOs or privately-owned companies. Others, in desperation, attempt to migrate abroad, only to perish at sea or suffer imprisonment, ultimately becoming part of the exploitative imperialist labor market. In essence, for those students excluded from the quota system, their lives lose meaning, and their future becomes aimless and uncertain.
The job market for educated and skilled individuals, especially young people from all backgrounds, remains extremely limited. This is a reflection of the severe unemployment crisis under the current system. As a result, frustration and resentment have been building among a large section of the youth. Under Hasina’s fascist regime, widespread corruption, rising prices of essential goods, and mass repression have further fueled the growing discontent. The frustrations of the youth have merged with the broader discontent simmering across all sectors of society. Various social classes and groups were already engaged in movements against these injustices, and the Hasina government responded by adopting fascist methods of suppression.
Due to the high likelihood of losing in any fair election, the regime intensified its brutal repression not only against the general people, but also against its bourgeois opposition. This relentless crackdown forced even its bourgeois rivals to engage in desperate struggles, heightening the political crisis.
Any form of protest against this unrestrained plunder, exploitation, and oppression was met with brutal repression, including extrajudicial killings in so-called “crossfire,” abductions, and attacks or “legal” actions against dissenters. Initially, the regime targeted Maoist revolutionaries for assassination, but later, even individuals who criticized the government on social media began to disappear.
In such an atmosphere, a vast number of underprivileged students and unemployed educated youth were poised to erupt in anger, seeking meaning in their lives and liberation from oppression. The demand for quota reform became a rallying point for widespread protests. This issue represented a culmination of 16 years’ worth of pent-up anger against fascism, and it was this frustration that sparked the outburst of resistance.

Material: What was the make-up of this movement, i.e., who was involved, and why? Was it just students and students of a certain class background? Did other sectors join and did most of the ordinary people in Bangladesh, in the cities and countryside, support the students and their actions, even their violent ones?

PBSP: In 2018, students from Dhaka University initiated the quota reform movement. Participation from general students gradually increased. At one point, under the pressure from the movement, Hasina’s government announced the abolition of all quotas as part of a new deceitful tactic. The students temporarily achieved a victory, but the government continued to plot against them.
In 2021, the fascist Hasina government took steps to reinstate the quota system through a High Court ruling, leading to a new phase of the quota reform movement. The students intensified their protests, continuing to push forward.
To suppress this movement, the fascist Hasina regime unleashed the Chhatra League, followed by the police firing indiscriminately—the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), and army personnel—initiating a massacre. In response, parents and poets, artists from music, cinema, and theatre, writers, and intellectuals rallied to support the students.
In the context of the quota issue, the students’ movement against the fascist Hasina government garnered support from all opposition political parties, political student organizations, and the urban and lower-middle-class populace. Initially, while a significant portion of the working class did not participate, the situation changed when Hasina’s fascist thugs from the Chhatra League openly attacked the students with weapons, aided by the police, culminating in the public murder of at least six individuals on July 16. This brutal escalation transformed the movement from one focused on quota reform into a broader political struggle against Hasina’s fascist regime.
As a result, impoverished citizens began to join the movement in large numbers, although the working class and peasants as a distinct social class did not participate as extensively, because the students did not have any program or demands that included them. Nonetheless, their support for this political movement became integrated into the overwhelming support by the majority of the population, rendering it unstoppable. In response, the government resorted to widespread shootings and repression, recognizing that this movement was jeopardizing their grip on power.
However, significant fractures began to emerge within the ruling class, particularly with the army withdrawing its support at the beginning of August. Even though they had not been very active in the massacres on the street after they were deployed in late July to assist the police (and their paramilitary wing, the RAB), this shift gave immense momentum to the street protests, ultimately leading to Hasina’s downfall.
It can be said that nearly everyone in the country expressed enthusiastic support for the movement. The violence perpetrated by the state was met with a general acceptance of the violence conducted by the protesters among the populace. Attacks on police forces were conducted by people, and the masses supported those attacks, because it was the police who conducted the genocide from the beginning. And it should be noted that, during Hasina’s regime, police became more seriously hated by the people. People largely approved of the targeting of Awami terrorist cadres, despite many student leaders and bourgeois parties condemning these actions. It is also important to note that without such violence, the ousting of Hasina’s Awami fascism would have been unattainable. The “peaceful” movement promoted by the bourgeoisie and so-called apolitical students would not have yielded any results.

Material: How was this massive protest the same as and/or different from previous ones?

PBSP: In the past, the anti-Ayub Khan2 military regime uprising in 1969 during the Pakistan era was primarily an anti-imperialist, anti-nationality oppression, democratic movement, with leftist and Maoist revolutionary parties and organizations playing a leading role. The patriotic, progressive peasant leader Maulana Bhashani was a key motivator, and there was active participation from students, cultural activists, progressive leftist writers, intellectuals, and the working peasantry.
In the anti-military authoritarian movement of the 1990s, the opposition began with leftists and Maoist revolutionary political groups. But after sometime, comprador bourgeois parties joined and gained leadership. They posed the only demand as the ousting of the military ruler Ershad. The uprising was led by political parties of the bourgeois class, along with their leftist allies. While some revisionist leftists participated in the uprising, the Maoists maintained a separate stance, firmly supporting a democratic revolution against all forms of imperialism, including that of the United States and Indian expansionism. At that time, our party was also leading a forceful armed struggle in the countryside.
This time (in 2024), the student movement emerged with the demand for reforming the job quota system, presenting itself as “non-political.” The leadership of the uprising was in the hands of “non-political” students and teachers, along with NGO leaders, all of whom were shaped by capitalist-imperialist education and morality. Political parties and organizations, while not in the lead, joined under the student banner, participating massively in the uprising for the sake of overthrowing fascism. Ultimately, the movement led to the downfall of Hasina’s fascist Awami regime. In the final stages of the uprising, there was significant and militant participation from urban poor and working-class youth, though there was still minimal involvement from workers’ organizations or the broader peasantry from rural areas.
In summary, the current movement, while one of the three major uprisings in the country’s history, was more backward in political vision compared to the 1969 and even the 1990 uprisings. The participation of the working class and the peasantry, as well as the inclusion of their agenda, was minimal. However, in terms of violence, this movement was more intense—both from the government and the people themselves—demonstrating that in the current social context, no movement can advance without violence. This has opened a space for popularizing the politics of people’s war.
Additionally, the role of women in this movement was significantly larger, which is connected to the increased participation of women in various sectors of society. This increased involvement is expected to have a positive impact on future people’s movements and serve as an obstacle to the further development of religious politics in the country.
Another notable aspect of this movement was the significant role played by students and people from the hill regions, a dynamic not seen in previous movements. This indicates that the hill people are becoming more involved in national politics, expanding their influence.
On the downside, this movement saw greater involvement of religious political forces than in any previous uprisings, which could lead to substantial challenges in the future.

Material: There have been some stories about people on the streets, armed with only sticks fighting back in bloody battles with the police and the military, even as the people around them were being mowed down by indiscriminate gunfire. This seems to indicate that the quota increase policy was probably the spark that set off a fire that was ready to ignite. Can you give an overview of the overall situation in Bangladesh and the general historical background that led to the overall situation, including:

  • Basic historical events, including the Liberation War and its international context;
  • History of the left/communists before and after independence;
  • Current domestic conditions, current international conditions.

(Is there an element at play where the world has seen the mass murder/genocide of the Palestinians and the subsequent exposure of the impotence and myth of international justice/morality—which then made it less risky for the state to do the same in Bangladesh?)

PBSP: You are correct; the situation was on the verge of explosion. The quota movement has served as a matchstick in this volatile scenario. At the same time, the state’s rapid descent into reckless public killings, the brutal assault on students in the streets, and the murders of children, teenagers, and women—all reminiscent of the situation in Palestine—have further ignited tensions.
As previously mentioned, following its separation from Pakistan in ‘71, the newly formed state of Bangladesh was seized by the Bengali comprador bourgeoisie. For the past 53 years, this class has governed the country—oscillating between one-party fascism, military dictatorship, parliamentary authoritarianism, and aggressive Bengali nationalist fascism under various guises. Most recently, the Awami League, led by the self-proclaimed agent of India, Sheikh Hasina, ruled continuously for nearly 16 years. Through various conspiracies, manipulations, deceit, and trickery, they maintained power via sham elections, while denying the voting rights of those who believe in bourgeois electoral democracy.
Corruption and nepotism have been rampant, while market prices remain uncontrolled due to party syndicates. The police’s genocide of the aggrieved populace over the quota issue became the spark. People across all political spectrums—right, left, Maoist, religious, and civil society—have erupted in protest. It’s a situation where no established party or leader is visible, yet there is widespread unrest and rebellion, with demonstrators taking over Sheikh Hasina’s government residences, “Gonobhaban.”
Our country’s true name is Purbo Bangla (East Bengal). This refers to the eastern region of the Bengal province in British India, while its western part is now included in India. East Bengal is officially known as “Bangladesh,” a name established during the creation of the state in 1971 with the direct intervention of India and its local collaborator, the Awami League.
Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has functioned as a semi-colonial, semi-feudal state. Within Pakistan, there were also nationality oppressions inflicted by the ruling elite upon various nationalities, with East Bengal (renamed East Pakistan) being the primary focus of this oppression. The ruling elite in Pakistan was predominantly based in West Pakistan and largely comprised non-Bengalis. Despite being incorporated into a religion-based Pakistan, a Bengali nationality movement rapidly emerged in East Bengal. This movement exploded with the famous Language Movement in 1952,3 led by leftist groups and progressive students, along with broad, nationalist, educated middle class people and intellectuals.
However, in the 1960s, a powerful nationalist movement also emerged under the leadership of the rising bourgeois party, the Awami League. They engaged in conflicts with the Pakistani ruling elite over the share of power of Pakistan, as Bengalis constituted the majority of the population in all of Pakistan (approximately 54%).
In response to the oppression and exploitation by the Pakistani rulers, the entire populace and significant political parties organized ongoing movements. Among these were anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles led by leftists/communists, alongside the Bengali nationalist movement represented by the Awami League. In this context, a great mass uprising occurred in 1969, forcing the military ruler Ayub Khan to resign, though he passed power to another military ruler, Yahya Khan.
In the aftermath of the mass uprising of ’69, a general election was held in Pakistan in ’70, in which the Maoists did not participate, as by that time they had moved towards armed politics. At that time, the Maoist left was quite strong, openly led by Maulana Bhasani. The Maoists, under Bhasani’s leadership, boycotted the election, while the pro-Soviet factions were weak. As a result, the Awami League achieved an outright majority across Pakistan, creating the possibility of power shifting into the hands of the Bengali bourgeoisie. The Pakistani ruling elite feared this reduction of their entrenched power and began plotting new conspiracies.
This ultimately culminated in the brutal genocide that began on March 25, 1971, when the Pakistani army launched an indiscriminate attack, killing hundreds of thousands of people within just nine months. In response to this atrocity, the entire nation took up arms to seek independence from Pakistan. However, the Awami League quickly faced defeat and fled to India. India seized this opportunity to dismantle its perennial rival, Pakistan. Lacking support from the United States, India struck a deal with the then Soviet social-imperialists and launched an attack on Pakistan. With the support of the Awami Liberation Army, Indian-backed forces established the state of Bangladesh on December 16, 1971.
During the Liberation War, various Maoist factions were active. They fought not only against the Pakistani army but also against the Awami Liberation Army, which was supported by India and Russia. These Maoist groups were divided across multiple fronts and exhibited various political and military missteps. Naturally, they faced defeat, allowing the Awami League to take power with India’s backing.
From that time onward, the Awami League has been identified as a collaborator of India. Although they initially gained some support from the populace in ‘71 and shortly thereafter, they quickly revealed themselves to be a fascist party. In the first half of the seventies, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was its leader. In response, nearly all bourgeois, leftist, and revolutionary parties in the country organized movements against him. Our party, led by founder-chairman Comrade Siraj Sikder, launched a strong armed struggle nationwide. However, the Mujibur government suppressed this movement through brutal repression, resulting in the martyrdom of Sikder. The party became battered and fragmented.
Taking advantage of this situation, finally a military coup in August 1975 killed Mujibur, along with his family, except his two daughters—one of them is Hasina. The military’s seizure of power received popular support because the people sought liberation from Mujibur and Awami fascism. From among these military rulers, a main bourgeois party, the BNP (Bangladesh Nationalist Party), emerged, which was somewhat opposed to the Awami League and India and had ties to the United States.
At one point, the BNP government was ousted, and in the 1980s, Ershad’s military dictatorship seized power. Throughout the 1980s, a strong anti-military-rule movement emerged. Our party, under the leadership of Comrade Anwar Kabir, also developed a robust armed struggle nationwide. The party also played a significant role in the ongoing mass movement. Initially, the ruling class brutally suppressed our struggle, but due to changes in the global situation, a mass movement led by the bourgeois parties—Awami League, BNP, and Jamaat4—managed to oust Ershad in 1990. This marked the beginning of 15 years of parliamentary authoritarianism, during which the Awami League, under Hasina’s leadership, formed government once, and the BNP, under Khaleda Zia, formed governments twice.
In response to the changing global situation, a military-backed government, with support from India and the United States, took power in 2007. Two years later, they brought the Awami League to power through an election. Since then, the Awami League had consolidated its power with direct support from India, destroying the bourgeois electoral system and imposing widespread repression—murder, abduction, and legal harassment—against revolutionary, leftist, progressive, and other main bourgeois rivals. Various sections of the population, including bourgeois political parties, have staged numerous movements demanding a credible election. However, the Hasina government has ruthlessly suppressed all dissent.
Currently, a significant aspect of the domestic situation is that the fascist Awami League is cornered, although they continue to conspire to regain power through Indian support and their influence in various sectors. Of this, the current ruling section is also fearful. Consequently, they are attempting to remove Awami-aligned individuals from high positions.
At present, if an election would held, there is a possibility that the main bourgeois party, the BNP, could come to power. However, the current ruling forces do not entirely favor this outcome, even though some BNP-affiliated individuals are present among them. Those who have come to power represent a different faction of the ruling class, commonly referred to as the “Third Force” in the country. This faction includes elements of the military, a significant portion of the bureaucracy, Western-leaning NGOs, and the Western-aligned section of the bourgeois intellectuals. They consistently attempt to discredit the two major bourgeois political parties, a process known as the “Minus Two Formula” in Bangladesh.
It’s true that the people have directly experienced the power and governance of the major bourgeois parties, and they are dissatisfied and disillusioned. At the same time, it’s also true that no other bourgeois party except the main two bourgeois parties, BNP and Awami League, has a strong base among the people. There are some Islamic religious parties, those have some organizations, but they are not so strong to take power. On the otherside, people also do not look favorably upon military rule. Hence, this third force seeks to stay in power through various civilian guises. They are utilizing a section of student leaders under the banner of “apolitical” organizations and are supporting various Islamic political and non-political forces. They do not aim to fully remove the Awami fascists either, as that is beyond their capability. It is also said that the current army chief himself is aligned with Hasina, Awami League, and India. Something that was also observed during Ershad’s military regime and the two-year pseudo-military government of 2007.
One possibility is that this government may wish to remain in power for some time to solidify their achievements. They will likely try to prevent the BNP from gaining an absolute majority. On the other hand, the BNP, along with some Islamic parties and bourgeois democratic/reformist groups, is pushing for swift elections. These tensions within different sections of the ruling class are increasing and are expected to escalate further. A coup or counter-coup could occur, and eventually, they might hold an election after some time.
The ongoing international situation is significantly influencing both the recent upheaval and the current political landscape. Over the past 15 years, the Awami League has enabled a section of the bourgeois ruling class to accumulate substantial wealth. India seeks to control Bangladesh through this faction while simultaneously exerting considerable pressure on the current government to keep them in check, particularly to prevent the rise of Chinese influence.
The current government heavily relies on the US and Western powers as a safeguard against India. Yunus [please see below], for instance, is a favored figure of these Western entities. However, the domestic economic situation is dire, with the government needing China for financial support and development activities. China is eager to take advantage of this opportunity. India is feeling uneasy about the Awami League’s dismal situation, because the AL is most dearest to her. However, as long as the government remains dependent on the US, India is unlikely to be too dissatisfied, although they will oppose any significant increase in Chinese influence. These dynamics have led to growing divisions and conflicts within different factions of the ruling class.
The condition of the people is grim, with rising prices of essential commodities. Power shifts in various sectors are ongoing. There is unrest among the working class, and the military continues to oppress national minorities in the hill regions. Although the government has dismissed a few high-ranking police and bureaucratic officials, the Awami League had entrenched itself so deeply within these institutions that they are now barely functioning. Their non-cooperation is becoming evident. Nevertheless, the people are relieved to be temporarily free from Awami fascism, though disillusionment is also growing. The phrase “whoever goes to Lanka becomes Ravan” (an analogy for corruption upon gaining power) is resurfacing. Some have even begun to express nostalgia for the previous regime, suggesting “things were better before.”
The current government is very weak, with little internal strength. Though a section of the student movement that propelled them to power remains with them, many are becoming disillusioned. Even political forces that once supported this government are gradually becoming critical.
In Palestine, the genocide that is happening—it’s not that Hasina didn’t want to do the same. But she couldn’t deploy the military for such a massacre. If she had been able to, the situation would have been different. However, the military withdrew their support from her. As mentioned earlier, various bourgeois factions and international forces have influence throughout the state apparatus. Particularly due to Hasina’s brutal fascist killings, the desperate struggle of students and the masses, and the participation of all bourgeois parties as well as all political parties in anti-Hasina movements, it was impossible for Hasina to deploy the military for such mass killings. Otherwise, it seems unlikely that she would have hesitated to carry out the same kind of destruction as in Palestine. However, while India might have supported it, the United States would likely have opposed it. This is the difference with Palestine.

Material: What were the events that led up to the beginning of the massacre? Can you describe some of the actions of the people and of the state? What was the tipping point for the state to begin the mass slaughter? Do you know how many people were killed and injured in the end?

PBSP: Although the protests were initially confined to demonstrations and rallies, on July 14th, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, in a public statement, indirectly referred to the quota reform protesters as “descendants of Razakars” (“Razakar” is a term in Bangladesh used as a derogatory political insult. It refers to those who collaborated with the Pakistani military during the 1971 genocide, engaging in mass killings, looting, rape, and oppression. They were branded as traitors and rapists).
On July 15th, across various parts of the country, the ruling party’s student wing, the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), launched violent attacks on students and protesters using rods, sticks, hockey sticks, machetes, and firearms. At the same time, the police, instead of protecting the people, resorted to brutal measures—using batons, rubber bullets, birdshot, sound grenades, tear gas, and indiscriminate beatings. Even in hospitals, where the wounded were receiving treatment, BCL members carried out attacks on the injured protesters. Dormitories were blockaded, with students beaten and some female students assaulted.
In an attempt to suppress the growing resistance, the government ordered the indefinite closure of almost all educational institutions.
This repression, however, only intensified the movement. By July 16th, the protests escalated. More protesters took to the streets, and the movement spread into educational campuses and residential halls. On the same day, in Begum Rokeya University, Rangpur, a student named Abu Sayeed was shot and killed by the police while standing unarmed fearlessly in front of the police firing. His death acted as a spark, igniting protests across the country. In response, demonstrators began to engage in counter-violence.
State infrastructure, which symbolized oppression, became targets of the protesters’ rage. They partially damaged the Bangladesh Television (BTV) building, the Jatrabari flyover, the Expressway toll plaza, the Bangladesh Road Transport Authority (BRTA) office, the Disaster Management Building, and even set fire to parts of the Metro Rail project—all symbols of Hasina’s “Development.”
The government realized that the movement was no longer confined to demands for quota reform. Instead, it has grown into a broader political struggle, calling for the trial of Hasina’s cabinet and gaining the support of the entire political spectrum. The government became fearful. In response, they embarked on a brutal campaign of mass violence to maintain their grip on power.
By July 19th, despite deploying the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL), other Awami League affiliates, the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB), Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), and police forces, and even shutting down the internet, the government failed to suppress the protests. In desperation, a nationwide curfew was imposed, and the army was deployed with orders to shoot on sight. What followed was a massacre, with indiscriminate gunfire aimed at quelling the uprising. Government forces fired on street demonstrations from helicopters as well. Though this state violence momentarily subdued the movement, by that time, political forces and large sections of the public had already mobilized.
There are indications that the military itself may have opted for a passive stance. Meanwhile, various segments of the ruling class—including former military and civilian bureaucrats, university professors, lawyers, journalists, NGOs, intellectuals, and artists—took to the streets in opposition. Women, laborers, and even many parents joined the mass resistance against Hasina’s increasingly fascist rule. The spontaneous outpouring of people in protest alarmed the government. In response, they chose even more violence to secure their power.
Alongside the 20,000 injured students and protesters, around above 700 were killed. The police filed over 500 cases and arrested more than 11,000 people. In addition to the students, 113 others, including children, pedestrians, and street vendors, lost their lives, with many from the working class among the victims.
The movement intensified, focusing solely on the demand for the government’s resignation. During this period, the military took a passive stance. Seizing the opportunity, protesters launched direct attacks on the police, setting fire to numerous stations and outposts, seizing weapons, and even freeing prisoners and arms from some jails. In retaliation, some of the armed thugs from the ruling party, who had attacked the protesters, were beaten to death and hung from bridges. Additionally, statues and posters of ruling party leaders were destroyed.
By August 4th, Awami League leaders began fleeing the country. On August 5th, millions of students and citizens marched into the capital, Dhaka, advancing toward the Prime Minister’s residence, “Gonobhaban.” By 2:30 PM, Sheikh Hasina, with the help of the military, fled to India.

Material: To what extent were Left forces present in the student movement and the protests on the street?

PBSP: Initially, the presence of leftist forces in the student movement was limited. However, as the situation escalated, all leftist groups—except some pro-government so-called left parties (known to be pro-China)—became actively involved. These independent leftist forces, through their national organizations, student unions, and cultural bodies, organized rallies and protests. In response to the Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL) and police attacks on the quota reform protesters, Maoist and other leftist student groups held torchlight processions, rallies, and demonstrations. They joined the mass non-partisan protests, using the opportunity to put forward their political ideology.
Despite their organizational weaknesses, Maoist and other leftist factions remained politically and ideologically active throughout the movement. They too became targets of violence by the BCL and police, reflecting the broader repression faced by any opposition to the ruling regime. Although smaller in numbers, these leftist forces contributed significantly to the movement, offering a radical critique of the state’s authoritarianism and aligning with the broader struggle against the Awami League’s authoritarian practices.

Material: What is your party’s assessment of and relationship with the student protests?

PBSP: The student movement began during a period of intense repression under Hasina’s fascist regime, when public outrage was at its peak. The students raised demands for the complete abolition of all quotas in government jobs, insisting on merit-based recruitment. This was a bourgeois demand, promoting the narrative that prioritized merit over the quota system. They popularized the bourgeois slogan of “no quotas, only merit.”
In contrast, we called for the complete abolition of the “Freedom Fighter quota” and a rational reform of the other quotas. Ultimately, the student movement converged on our demands. It was from this position that we engaged with the protests. When the government conceded to the demand to abolish freedom fighters descendant quota system amidst the massacre of students and the wider public, we declared that while the movement had achieved victory, the blood had not yet dried. Thus, we argued that the student uprising must be transformed into a struggle to overthrow Hasina’s fascist regime.
As the movement for Hasina’s ousting gained momentum, we presented a tactical program for the formation of a temporary people’s government, representing anti-fascist political forces and the oppressed classes and professions. Although this proposal was unlikely to be effective in the prevailing circumstances, it played a crucial role in revealing the character of a potential new government. Additionally, it contributed to educating a progressive segment of society.
Our party engaged in some limited armed propaganda in rural areas, destroying a few abandoned police stations and launching attacks on some Awami League leaders. However, given the rapid changes in the situation and our relatively weak position, these actions were insignificant compared to the huge spontaneous movement and violent activities of the people.
Our assessment has been and continues to be that the students’ movement is a democratic, issue-based struggle. While bourgeois students are present, all forces opposed to Hasina’s fascism came together within this movement. There was a possibility that the movement could stall if the demands were met or due to government repression. Opposition bourgeois parties would likely try to transform it into a platform for ousting the government, and Maoist and anti-imperialist left groups could also find opportunities to organize and develop their struggles.
The students’ shift towards the goal of overthrowing the government was primarily driven by the indiscriminate massacres carried out by the fascist Hasina regime in the name of suppressing the student movement, as well as the solidarity and active involvement of all political parties and organizations opposed to fascism. Many of the so-called “apolitical” students, having been educated under bourgeois and religious influences, might fall under direct imperialist intervention or be used by opposition bourgeois and religious fundamentalist groups like the BNP and Jamaat.
We have been involved in this movement with the aim of overthrowing Hasina’s fascist rule and creating opportunities for an anti-imperialist democratic politics that can serve the needs of a new democratic revolution.

Material: Did the protests and the massacre drive more young people to the Left?

PBSP: In the act of indiscriminately firing upon the protesting students, the student wing of the ruling party and state forces killed ordinary people. As a result, the public rallied in greater support for the students, intensifying the movement. However, this violence did not lead the students to adopt a more leftist ideology. The main leaders of student activists, who believed in capitalist-imperialist reforms, opposed the political framework that linked them to the working class and peasantry, revolutionary politics, and popular power. They also maintained a check on the politics of all opposition bourgeois parties, including the BNP and Jamaat, in an effort to bring a “Third Force” to power. This situation has persisted even after the formation of an interim government. Nevertheless, those who participated in this movement for a truly independent and democratic state, free from fascism, imperialism, and Indian expansionism, have found renewed motivation to organize and equip themselves in the revolutionary spirit of Maoism and anti-imperialism, more so than ever before.

Material: Why did Hasina flee? Has India indicated that it will try to intervene more overtly in the ongoing situation?

PBSP: In the face of a mass uprising by the student and citizenry, as the police and RAB were overwhelmed and retreated, the military, under Sheikh Hasina’s orders, refused to open fire on the agitated public, following a cunning plan orchestrated by American imperialism behind the scenes. At this point, Hasina became frightened, fearing for her life amidst the public outrage. She did not want to be captured and killed by the people or face trial. Moreover, with her power stripped away, her priority was to secure any resources she could take with her and maintain control over the embezzled wealth to ensure her own safety—this was the most convenient and secure option for this anti-people, traitorous dictator. The power structure supporting Hasina collapsed during the peoples uprising, rendering her inactive and without any means of survival. This was the primary reason for her flight. Additionally, she hoped that India would provide her with security, future plans, and assistance for her rehabilitation.
India has already intervened overtly, sheltering the fugitive and reviled Hasina. From there, she is also engaging in activities against the country and its people. At the same time, India is negotiating with the current government. It is possible that India could provide support to change the power dynamics held by the fascist forces that remain in power or exert pressure on the current government to create a situation where the Awami League can recover. This would at least allow them to participate in any upcoming elections. In this way, India is executing a dual conspiracy. The understanding between the US and India, mainly to resist China’s influence, will also play a significant role in this context.
However, given the current sentiment of the people against the Awami League, Hasina, and India, direct intervention may not be seen as a favorable option for India. They are likely to adopt a more prolonged process, knowing that the current government is neither revolutionary nor a government of the people; they are dependent on the US, and there are many pro-India elements within the existing power structure. As long as this government does not become too close to China, it seems unlikely that India will engage in major destructive actions.

Material: Why did the military give over power (at least in appearance) to an interim civilian government?

PBSP: In terms of structure, the military served as the protector of Hasina’s fascist regime. However, in the context of the mass uprising, American imperialism supported resistance against Hasina’s fascism. At the same time, it was a challenging task to gain support from lower-ranking officers for the brutal massacres of the populace. Additionally, there were always rival bourgeois forces like the BNP or Jamaat, as well as anti-India and US-aligned support within a segment of the military. There has been an ongoing debate at the international level regarding whether to send Bangladeshi troops to the United Nations peacekeeping forces, which has significant implications within the military, as they prefer to focus on their own benefits rather than military rule.
After Hasina’s fall, the state, ruling class, and their imperialist masters found themselves in a crisis. They did not want to bring the military to the forefront but also didn’t want to grant too much space to civilian political forces. Furthermore, there is a strong tradition of anti-military rule movements among the people of this country. Consequently, the military is running the country by putting forth a segment of NGOs, intellectuals, former bureaucrats, and some student groups that supported the uprising.
Now, direct military rule is not the preferred option for the US because they understand that, regardless of the circumstances, the spirit of the recently concluded mass uprising was one of “democracy,” not another form of fascism or military rule. Accordingly, the US and military-bureaucratic elements have planned their approach. In a critical situation that goes against American imperialist plans or lacks their support, the military does not have the capability to control state power. Therefore, they have handed over power to an interim government led by Dr. Yunus, who is favored by the US and the West.
Another reason is the public sentiment. At least at this moment, neither the protesting populace nor any political force would support direct military rule—this is something they have taken into account. However, it does not mean they won’t want to seize that opportunity later. Already, discussions about this are taking place within the country. Among educated middle-class and bourgeois analysts, debates are going on both in favor of and against this, which is expected to intensify in the future.

Material: Historically, when appointed civilian governments take power after a revolt or coup, the leadership of the mass movement that led to the fall or collapse of the government is often coopted and used to stabilize and re-consolidate bourgeois power. Has this happened in Bangladesh as well? Are there leaders or prominent people in the movement who have taken a different stand, against this new interim government formation?
Who is Muhammad Yunus? What is his background? At first glance, he seems to be a darling of the West, a Nobel Laureate who has a strong base in the petty-bourgeoisie intellectuals. Who is behind his power and his ability to stay in power? Aside from the Hasina faction, are there other factions within the bourgeois class that are vying for control of the state?

PBSP: Here too, various bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political forces that were in favour of the uprising have assisted and assisting the state and the interim government in stabilizing and consolidating their power. However, as time passes, differences in positions within the interim government are becoming apparent among them. While some want to prolong this government, many, especially the main bourgeois party BNP, will oppose it. It seems that a faction is also working directly to bring about military rule.
Muhammad Yunus is an economist; more precisely, he is a banker, referred to in Hasina’s words as a moneylender. However, this bank is, in his words, “the bank for the poor.” Traditionally, banks lend to the wealthy. Yunus demonstrates that the poor also have the “right” to access loans, and that the poor repay loans better than the wealthy. This is known as microcredit—giving small loans to the poor and collecting them in tiny installments along with interest.
This work has been praised highly by imperialists, as it claims to eradicate poverty among the poor in Third World countries without revolution. As a result, he has gained immense significance within American and Western circles. For this, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. He began his microcredit work in 1976 and has primarily worked in our country for nearly 48 years. Dr. Yunus’s work in Bangladesh has been evaluated as a means of poverty alleviation and establishing social and political peace by the imperialists. In reality, no one can claim that his work has brought any peace to the lives of ordinary people in Bangladesh, let alone among the broader middle class or wealthy individuals.
Generally speaking, Dr. Yunus is not very popular or well-known among the basic people. The American/Western propaganda abroad does not reflect the situation in the country. However, among some educated circles, he holds a bourgeois public opinion as the only Nobel laureate. As an individual, he has many personal friends among Western imperialist intellectuals, including former US President Bill Clinton and Hillary Clinton.
During Hasina’s final term, Yunus was persecuted because Hasina believed that his role was a reason for Western resentment toward Hasina. Hasina propagated that the US was trying to establish an “apolitical” interim government through Yunus after removing Hasina. Yunus had always claimed that such propaganda was not true and that he had no political ambitions. However, Hasina’s assertions have turned out to be correct.
The ruling elite in Bangladesh consists of two major bourgeoise parties: the Awami League and the BNP. Additionally, there are several powerful and influential religious parties and organizations, including Jamaat. To control these entities, imperialists have sought to bring forward civil society with the assistance of military bureaucrats as another front. Since 2007, Western imperialism has been pursuing this effort with Yunus at the forefront. This is the reason for Yunus’s conflict with Hasina, who is pro-India. Other bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties are not particularly fond of him either. However, after the ousting of Hasina’s fascism, during a time of power vacuum, they have accepted such an “apolitical” interim figure over at least a direct military rule. They hope that he will step aside after handing over power to an elected government through an election, especially the BNP, which anticipates forming a government by winning in the elections.
However, various factions of the bourgeois class have begun to fight for control of the state. It is not yet the time to definitively determine what the outcome of this will be.

Material: What do you project to happen next? For the students? For the Left?

PBSP: During the interim government’s tenure, it is anticipated that there will be some opportunities to develop organizational struggles and propaganda, leveraging the bourgeois democratic openings and the ongoing weaknesses of the state apparatus. The so-called apolitical student movements have highlighted the vulnerabilities of the mass uprising, which has increased American imperialism’s interference. It has already become apparent that the new rulers will not do anything beneficial for the oppressed working class, peasants, and the nation. This creates an opportunity for the left to present an anti-imperialist democratic agenda and to establish revolutionary politics aimed at empowering the working class, peasants, and middle class.
However, a complete military rule could also emerge in the future. This would present different challenges and opportunities for the development of revolutionary struggles. In this context, the tradition of the people’s movements against military dictatorship in this country will play a role in the development of revolutionary forces. Notably, the issues of the working class are evolving, and peasants are facing crises. Therefore, there will be opportunities to develop class-based movements.

Material: What is the work ahead for the Left?

PBSP: The primary task for the left, particularly for the Maoists, is to fully overthrow Hasina’s fascism and to present an anti-imperialist democratic agenda. This involves exposing the anti-national and anti-people activities of the new ruling class formed by remnants of Hasina’s regime, which has come to power with the backing of American imperialism in the name of establishing democracy. It also entails building a revolutionary struggle to establish the power of the oppressed working class, peasants, and national minorities.
Already, movements have emerged demanding overdue wages and improved conditions for garment workers, as well as protests by rickshaw pullers. In the Chittagong Hill Tracts, there is a movement demanding the withdrawal of covert military rule and the establishment of autonomy for indigenous peoples. Movements against the ban on student politics in educational institutions have also started. Furthermore, there are conditions for protests from peasants regarding the lack of fair prices for their crops and demands for lower prices on fertilizers, oil, electricity, irrigation, and agricultural equipment.
Additionally, in rural areas, there is an opportunity for landless and poor peasants to organize movements for government khas land5 and water bodies against the landlords, usurers, and moneylenders. In other words, the left must move forward with the fundamental agenda of a new democratic revolution.

 

  1. Hussain Muhammad Ershad, a military officer, was president of Bangladesh from 1982–1990 after seizing power against President Abdus Sattar. He subsequently declared martial law and suspended the Constitution. Ershad was eventually forced from power by a popular mass uprising led by bourgeois parties.—Ed., Material.
  2. Mohammad Ayub Khan was the second president of Pakistan from 1958–1969. He took power by organizing a military coup to oust President Iskander Ali Mirza who had imposed martial law. Ayub Khan was forced to resign in 1969 after a mass uprising of students and workers.—Ed., Material.
  3. After India was divided in 1947 and Pakistan was created, Purbo Bangla became a province of Pakistan. From the very beginning, Pakistani rulers, who were mainly from the west, suppressed the Bangali Nation. One of the aspects of Nationality oppression was the suppression of the Bangla language, making Urdu the only state language (although Bangla Pakistan’s main language). In opposition, students and intellectuals demanded Bangla be one of the state languages. In 1952, this movement erupted into a nationwide upsurge, which culminated on February 21, 1952. The rulers responded by firing and killing many people, before finally surrendering to the demand. This became known as the Historic Language Movement.
  4. Jamaat-e-Islami is a bourgeois political party and the largest Islamist political party in Bangladesh.—Ed., Material.
  5. Khas land is land that is not owned by anyone and, by law, should be distributed to poor peasants. In reality, these lands are seized by the powerful and wealthy classes in rural areas. Government officials and police are bribed to help the semi-feudal landlords or the wealthy to seize these lands.—Ed., Material.