The three way fight thesis criticizes the Comintern’s views on fascism by arguing that fascism is not “commanded” by the most reactionary elements of finance capital. But both Dimitrov in his speech at the 7th Congress of the Comintern and Kusinnen (presenting the report at the 13th plenum of the Comintern EC) were speaking about fascism in power not fascist movements.
The accession to power of fascism is not an ordinary succession of one bourgeois government by another, but a substitution of one state form of class domination of the bourgeoisie—bourgeois democracy—by another form—open terrorist dictatorship (Dimitrov).
Fascism in power is the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital (Kusinnen).
Moreover, though fascist movements are often opposed to the existing political setup and ruling class parties in their initial period, sooner or later they get the support of a section of finance capital and state machinery. They thrive and grow with such support. Mussolini was aided by British imperialism. Arguments being made about ‘relative autonomy’ of such movements fail to address this.
According to the three way fight thesis:
[F]ar-right movements, of which fascism is one tendency, are not merely shock-troopers of the most reactionary capitalists. . . they may collaborate with police or find common cause with some factions of capital. But they are system-oppositional forms of organizing (emphasis added).
“System-oppositional” is defined as posing social and political challenge to the status quo and challenging state power. During the period of their formation and growth fascist movements often challenge ruling class parties or government views or clash with the state machinery. But that doesn’t make them system-oppositional. They never challenge the capitalist system, bourgeois rule or state power.
The three way fight thesis ignores, and thus, covers up the qualitative differences of the contradictions between the three poles, i.e., the ruling class/State, fascist movements and peoples’ movements. The contradiction between the former two can be come antagonistic at times, but, essentially, it is non-antagonistic. Which is also why using the term system-oppositional to describe fascist movements is wrong. The contradiction between peoples’ movements and the other two is basically antagonistic, though it may become non-antagonistic with some sections among them, in some specific situations.
Pointing to the mixed class composition of fascist movements, the three way fight thesis argues that fascism does not have unequivocal class character. This fails to distinguish between its class composition and class character. Kusinnen’s Report dealt with this: “The question of the class character of fascism must not be confused with the question of the class composition of the fascist mass movement. . . the class composition of this movement is very mixed. . . . The decisive thing is: what class policy does it pursue? Which class does it serve?”
three way fight thesis criticizes Dimitrov for drawing a clear line between ordinary bourgeois governance and fascist state power. This poses two questions. 1) Is there any clear distinction between ordinary bourgeois governance and fascist governance? The answer is yes, there is. In the normal functioning of bourgeois democracy the violence of the State is veiled. When summoned into action it is presented as an exceptional step called for by exceptional conditions; by a situation where the so-called “rule of law” has been upset. Fascism subverts this notion. The exceptional is now made out as the common place. This then become the justification for continuous, open, state violence and the suppression of democratic rights. Not just state violence, the violence of fascist mobs against the “others” too is legitimized as the new normal of social existence. A “rigid concept of life” is made explicit as unbending norms of social behavior and political life. All diversities get branded as defilement of an assumed “national ideal.” All dissent is stamped as treachery.
The second question is, does the move to a fascist rule lead to any new political situation, provide new opportunities for the communist party? Here too the answer is yes, it does. Parliamentary illusions of a large sections of the masses get dispelled. Even ruling class parties and some sections of the state machinery become willing to cooperate, even if indirectly, with the Communist Party. The possibility of formal or informal front activity emerges at a broader level. As Kusinnen pointed out, “. . . revolutionary development is simultaneously hindered and accelerated by the fascist fury of the bourgeoisie.”
The masses in imperialist countries definitely do suffer from suppressive state measures even under conditions of bourgeois democracy. But the suspension of electoral democracy and constitutionally assured democratic rights will stand out as a distinct event. Refusing to acknowledge this means losing a tactical opportunity. It would be a ‘left’ opportunist error.
The Comintern’s discussion and thesis on fascism and united front were focused on imperialist countries, where the opportunity for a revolutionary seizure of political power is not always present. The question of whether the anti-fascist struggle would lead to a revolution or not depended on many objective factors. In those days, electoral struggle was a widely applied tactics in imperialist countries. Hence the guidance to parties in those type of countries to take up Popular Front tactics in the electoral front in order to prevent fascist parties from coming to power. But did the Comintern insist on forming such fronts as the necessary way to seize power? No.
Dimitrov clearly stated, it is
“wrong to imagine that the united front government is an indispensable stage on the road to the establishment of proletarian dictatorship. Just as wrong as the view that fascist dictatorship is certain to be immediately superseded by proletarian dictatorship. . . . Will the proletariat itself be prepared at the decisive moment for the direct overthrow of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of its own power? Or will the movement of the proletariat and the anti-fascist Popular Front at that particular stage be in a position only to suppress or overthrow fascism, without directly proceeding to abolish the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie?
The French and Italian Communist Parties failed to build on the gains made through their leading role in the Resistance movements. They surrendered to the bourgeoisie. But this was not an outcome of the Comintern’s anti-fascist line. It came from the Right opportunist deviation of those parties. This is furthered affirmed by the victorious revolutions in Albania and Yugoslavia, both of whom faced political conditions more or less similar to that of France and Italy.
Communist parties certainly need to develop their understanding on the emergence and growth of fascism. They also need to develop suitable tactics for this. The basic guidance given by the Comintern remains of great use in carrying out this task. It must be enriched and amplified, not negated. Militant denial of public spaces to fascist movements is certainly necessary. But one must not forget that there will always be serious limitations in carrying this out. The state will most often than not aid the fascists and crackdown on the communists. What is needed is a multipronged struggle addressing the issues attracting various segments of the masses to fascist movements.